Moonpig was shut down during the holiday season. The website feels sorry but the personal data of their users are important.

Moonpig needs to protect their users of its mobile apps because they had to pack up their services as the result of security bug. They needed to protect the personal details of three million customers.

The flaw, represented by one observer as "the worst security I've ever seen from an oversized company", let any assaulter access the private details of each single client on the website, also as read past orders and place new ones on any of their accounts.

The developer WHO discovered the vulnerability, Paul Price, says he at first disclosed it to MoonPig privately on August eighteen 2013. Once nearly eighteen months of prevaricating by the firm, value set to travel public with the flaw.
"The trade commonplace is typically inside ninety days, I gave them thirteen months," he told the Guardian. "I then gave them an additional four months and still no fix. It's at now I made a decision to travel public with my findings.
"It wasn't a straightforward call because it was a live vulnerability however I did know it'd grab Moonpig's attention and force them to repair it. WHO is aware of however long this has been 'in the wild' and if hackers square measure was habitually scraping Moon pics customers knowledge for the last two years?"
Only once Price's post was printed did MoonPig shut access to their mobile apps, protection off the protection hole.
"I've seen some half-arsed security measures in my time however this simply takes the biscuit," wrote value. "Whoever architected this technique must be shot waterboarded."
The vulnerability is found within the section of software package that lets MoonPig's mobile apps communicate with its servers, known as AN application programming interface (API). Value found that, instead of firmly causing info protected by AN individual's username and parole, the API sent each request protected by identical credentials, notwithstanding that user was signed in.The only approach the app knew that user's account, it was handling, was a nine-digit range, transmitted unencrypted. Accessing another user's account was as straightforward for value as ever-changing that range and re-sending the request, and grants info together with communication addresses, birthdays, email addresses, phone numbers, and a little of MasterCard knowledge, together with the last four digits and termination dates. Passwords aren't leaked, nor enough MasterCard knowledge to form an acquisition.